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Financial Innovations and Endogenous Growth




This paper explores the channels through which innovations in the
ﬁnancial sector lead to economic growth. The channels identiﬁed are
capital accumulation and technological innovation. The ﬁrst is fulﬁlled
by ﬁnancial intermediaries which transform household savings into pro-
ductive investment by ﬁrms, the second by venture capitalists which
fund risky technological projects with high potential payoﬀs. The rate
of ﬁnancial innovation is determined by the amount of labor (or human
capital) devoted to the sector as well as by spillovers from existing ﬁ-
nancial products. By embedding such a sector into the Romer (1990) -
Jones (1995) and Lucas (1988) - Uzawa (1965) frameworks, it is shown
that ultimately, ﬁnancial innovations can only lead to long-run growth
through its venture capital role. The transformative role of the ﬁnan-
cial sector only leads to temporary growth eﬀects on the transitional
path to the steady state.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why does the ﬁnancial sector matter to the real economy? The ever-rising
number of graduates from top American and European universities being
recruited by ﬁnancial powerhouses and their handsome remuneration lend
credence to the suggestion that the ﬁnancial sector must be a highly valu-
able engine of growth in an advanced economy. Extensive media coverage
of the activities of the ﬁnance industry seem to conﬁrm its pre-eminence.
Even in the other pillar of the New Economy, the real technological sec-
tor, ﬁnancial ﬁr m si nt h eg u i s eo fv e n t u r ec a p i t a l i s t sa r es e e na st h ek e y
to inducing high-risk, potentially high-return ideas and innovations. How-
ever, the standard theoretical growth literature (including the New Growth
Theory of the last ﬁfteen years) notably excludes any meaningful role for
the ﬁnancial sector to inﬂuence long-run growth. Savings by households
are automatically assumed to be transformed into productive investment
1by ﬁrms at every point in time by appealing to the “savings equal invest-
ment in equilibrium” argument. The vast majority of papers that have been
w r i t t e no nt h e“ ﬁnance-growth nexus” describe microeconomic models that
detail how ﬁnancial institutions alleviate borrowing constraints, perform risk
management, acquire information to assist in resource allocation, monitor
managers, mobilize savings and lead to rising specialization and eﬃciency in
production. There is also an extensive literature on the empirical evidence
linking development of the ﬁnance sector to economic growth [see, for exam-
ple, Arestis and Demetriades (1997), Demetriades and Hussein (1996) and
King and Levine (1993a)].
This paper aims to ﬁll that important gap in the literature by explain-
ing how a ﬁnancial sector can be incorporated into an endogenous growth
macroeconomic model such as those by Romer (1990) and Lucas (1988).
Just as Romer constructs a dynamic equation describing the production
of new designs or blueprints in the research and development sector, we
develop a dynamic equation describing the production of ﬁnancial innova-
tions that continuously improves the eﬃciency of the intermediation process
which transforms savings into investment and lubricates R&D activities in
the real technological sector. In addition, the ﬁnancial innovations sector
may also be modelled in competition with a human capital producing sector
for that scarce resource a là Lucas. We also explain the complicated ways in
which households, ﬁnancial innovators, ﬁnancial intermediaries, R&D ﬁrms,
intermediate and ﬁnal goods producers interact and are intertwined in our
model of the macroeconomy. Finally, we distinguish between the competi-
tive, decentralized solution and that of a hypothetical social planner.
Levine (1997) lays out a sound theoretical approach to the study of the
relationship between ﬁnance and growth. He argues that market frictions
such as information and transaction costs motivate the emergence of ﬁnan-
cial markets and intermediaries, which serve multiple functions: facilitating
the trading, hedging, diversifying, and pooling of risk; allocating resources;
monitoring managers and exerting corporate control; mobilizing savings; and
facilitating the exchange of goods and services. These ﬁnancial functions in
turn aﬀect economic growth through the channels of capital accumulation
and technological innovation. Figure 1, reproduced from Levine (1997),
summarizes his theoretical approach. In the context of this approach, our
paper may be seen as an elaboration on the channels of growth,w h i l ea l m o s t
all of the existing literature relate to the functions of ﬁnancial systems.F o r
example, the impact of ﬁnancial development on growth through its eﬀect
on borrowing constraints is studied by Bencivenga and Smith (1993), Japelli
and Pagano (1994) and de Gregorio (1996). Bencivenga and Smith (1991)
a n dO b s t f e l d( 1994) study the impact of ﬁnancial development on growth
through its facilitation of risk management. Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997)
look at savings mobilization, while King and Levine (1993b) construct a
model in which ﬁnancial systems evaluate prospective entrepreneurs, mobi-
2lize savings to ﬁnance the most promising productivity-enhancing activities,
and diversify the risks associated with these innovative activities, thereby
improving the probability of successful innovation. Similarly, Saint-Paul
(1992) looks at how capital markets facilitate the adoption of more special-
ized and productive technologies. Broadly speaking, our paper complements
the existing literature by telling a macroeconomic story of how the produc-
tion of ﬁnancial innovations aﬀect growth through capital accumulation and
technological innovation, while the existing literature provide rich detailed
examples of how ﬁnancial markets and intermediaries fulﬁlt h e i rﬁnancial
functions from a microeconomic perspective.
Figure 1: Levine’s (1997) Theoretical Approach to Finance and Growth
The paper is organized as follows: the next section describes a basic
growth model with a ﬁnancial sector and derives its analytical solution.
Section 3 delves into the details of a growth model with both endogenous
technological progress and ﬁnancial innovations, explaining the decentral-
ized model in considerable detail, and explores the comparative statics of its
solution. Section 4 examines a model with human capital and ﬁnancial inno-
vations and graphs the implications of its solutions, while Section 5 discusses
the policy implications arising from these models. Section 6 concludes.
32T h e B a s i c M o d e l
To isolate the workings of our proposed ﬁnancial sector, we ﬁrst embed it in a
standard no-frills growth model with intertemporal household optimization
but without endogenous technological progress. We will see that, unsur-
prisingly, the model is incapable of generating endogenous growth in the
steady-state. The eﬃciency and development of the ﬁnancial sector gener-
ates non-zero growth in per-capita variables only on the transitional path to
the steady state. Moreover, changes in the production function of ﬁnancial
innovations (or new ﬁnancial products) generate only level but not growth
eﬀects.
The ﬁnancial sector in this model comprises ﬁnancial innovators and
ﬁnancial intermediaries. The former produce new ﬁnancial “blueprints”
(products and services) using labor that is diverted from the production of
the ﬁnal consumption good. These “blueprints” include innovations such as
ATMs, phone and internet banking, derivatives of existing ﬁnancial prod-
ucts (including new options), initial public oﬀerings (IPOs) of companies
and anything which enables funds to be channelled more eﬀectively from
savers (households) to borrowers (ﬁrms seeking to raise capital to ﬁnance
the purchase of new plant and equipment). We denote the stock of ﬁnancial
products (ie. old ﬁnancial innovations) as τ. Analogous to the Romer (1990)
speciﬁcation of the real R&D sector, the development of the ﬁnancial sector
is characterized by an ever-expanding variety of ﬁnancial products. For sim-
plicity, there is no “creative destruction” of existing ﬁnancial products by
successively superior products That is, there are no quality ladders in ﬁnan-
cial products. However, the existing stock of ﬁnancial innovations/products
aﬀect the production of new ﬁnancial ideas according to
˙ τ = F(uτL)λτφ,
where uτ is the fraction of the labor force employed by the ﬁnancial sector,
and F, λ,and φ are constants.
The idea is that of a spillover eﬀect from each ﬁnancial innovation: ﬁ-
nancial innovators may build upon the ideas of other innovators to create a
diﬀerentiated or improved ﬁnancial product.
Financial intermediaries, on the other hand, are responsible for inter-
mediating funds between borrowers and lenders. Borrowers are produc-
ers of the ﬁnal consumption good while lenders are households with sav-
ings. The eﬃciency at which savings can be transformed into productive
investment is speciﬁed to be dependent on the existing stock of ﬁnancial
innovations/products per adjusted capita (τ/Lκ, which we will label as ξ,
0 < κ < 1), which proxies for the state of development and sophistication of








1−α − C (t)
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− δK (t),
where K is the stock of capital, L is the number of workers, A is a (constant)
technological parameter, and uY is the share of labor devoted to ﬁnal goods
production.1 By including κ in our measure of transformative eﬃciency ξ, we
are acknowledging that some ﬁnancial innovations may be rivalrous (such as
t h ec r e a t i o no fe a c hn e wI P O ,w h i c hm a yb e n e ﬁt from the knowledge gained
from previous IPOs but nevertheless requires new labor to be expended in
order to tailor it to the needs of individual ﬁrms) while others are not (such
as a new ﬁnancial instrument, which may in fact beneﬁt from “thick market”
eﬀects as it becomes more widely traded). By restricting κ to lie strictly
between 0 and 1, we are saying that in the aggregate, ﬁnancial innovations
or products are neither fully rivalrous nor fully non-rivalrous.2
In the steady state, τ/Lκ must be constant by deﬁnition. Therefore,
if the labor force grows at the constant rate n, then the rate of ﬁnancial
innovations in the steady state must equal κn. Why must the number of
ﬁnancial products continually increase in the steady state even when all
savings are completely transformed into investment? We argue that as the
labor force or population increases, so does the volume of funds that have
to be intermediated. Due to the rivalrous nature of some ﬁnancial products
and services, this rising volume results in congestion and decreased eﬃciency
in the ﬁnancial sector unless more ﬁnancial products are devised to alleviate
the strain on it. Loosely speaking, resources such as labor must continue to
be directed to the ﬁnancial sector as it services an expanding economy.
2.1 The Social Planner’s Problem
We now proceed to lay out the social planner’s problem and discuss the
steady-state solutions of the model. The social planner seeks to maximize
the representative consumer’s stream of discounted utility assuming a Con-










1Pagano (1993) speciøes the saving-investment relationship as φS = I, where 1 − φ is
theÆ ow of saving ￿ lost￿in theprocess of ønancial intermediation. This (exogenous, in his
case) fraction goes to banksasthe￿ spread between lending and borrowing rates, and to
securit ies brokers and dealers as commissions, fees and t he like￿ (pp. 614-615).
2If κ =1 , the n all ønancial productsares trictly rivalrous ; if κ =0 , the n all ønancial
products are strictly non-rivalrous, so that the e￿ciency of ønancial intermediation is
dependent only on the stock of ønancial products and independent of population size.
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+µF (1 − uY )
λ Lλτφ, (5)
where the control variables are c and uy, the state variables are K and τ,
and ν and µ are the costate variables associated with K and τ respectively.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the control variables are
∂H
∂C
= c−θe−ρt − ντ =0 , (6)
∂H
∂uy
= ντAKα (1 − α)u−α
Y L1−α−κ − µFλ(1 − uY )
λ−1 Lλτφ =0 . (7)















= F (1 − uY )
λ Lλτφ−1. (9)
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the costate variables are
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−µF (1 − uY )
λ Lλφτφ−1. (12)
Finally, the transversality conditions are
lim
t→∞
ν (t)K (t)=0 , (13)
lim
t→∞
µ(t)τ (t)=0 . (14)
62.1.2 Variables in the Steady State
To arrive at the steady-state solutions, we ﬁrst deﬁne the following three
variables k ≡ K/L, χ ≡ C/K and ξ ≡ τ/Lκ. In the steady state, we


















We also require that ˙ uY /uY =0in the steady state. Hence, ˙ k/k =0as well
in order to satisfy equation (16), so the growth rate of output per capita
y/y is zero. Furthermore, it is assumed that ˙ χ/χ = ˙ ξ/ξ =0in the steady
state. Since L grows at the exogenous rate n according to equation (4),
these assumptions imply that, to have a balanced growth path, we must
have ˙ Y/Y = ˙ K/K = ˙ C/C = n and ˙ τ/τ = κn in the steady state. From
˙ τ = Fuλ
τLλτφ,w eh a v eγτ ≡ ˙ τ/τ = Fuλ
τLλτφ−1. Taking logarithms of the
latter equation and diﬀerentiating both sides with respect to time provide
us the solution to the steady-state growth rate of τ, γ∗
τ = λn/(1 − φ).
Since ˙ τ/τ = κn, the solution implies that κ = λ/(1 − φ).T h e s t e a d y -
s t a t eg r o w t hr a t eo fn is comparable to the Cass (1965) - Koopmans (1965)
formulation of the Solow (1956) - Swan (1956) model without technological
progress. In their model, the absence of technological progress eventually
results in aggregate output growing at rate n since there are no increases in
productivity to oﬀset the diminishing marginal product of physical capital.
Here, output grows at rate n in the steady state since there are limits to the
eﬃciency of ﬁnancial innovations in transforming the ﬂow of savings to new
physical capital.
The model is solved in terms of the four unknowns k, χ, ξ and uY .T h e
four equations needed to pin down the solutions to the four unknowns are
given by ˙ k/k =0 , ˙ χ/χ =0 , ˙ ξ/ξ =0and ˙ uY /uY =0 . These four conditions
lead to the following equations respectively:
ξAkα−1u1−α
Y − ξχ = n + δ, (17)
ξAαkα−1u1−α
Y = ρ + n + δ, (18)


















Y − δ − (1 − λ)n. (20)
72.1.3 Analytical Solutions to the Model
Using equations (17) to (20), we obtain the following solutions for uY , uτ,






where Γ ≡ αλγ∗
τ(n+δ), Φ ≡ (1−α)(ρ + λn)(ρ+n+δ), γ∗
τ = λn/(1 − φ),
u∗
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2.2 Implications of the Model
Proposition 1 The ﬁnancial innovations sector has no inﬂuence on the
steady-state growth rate of the economy.
In the steady state, the variables Y , K,a n dC all grow at the rate n,
the population growth rate, in order to achieve a balanced growth path,
while τ grows at rate κn. In spite of its role in transforming funds into
productive investments, the ﬁnancial innovations sector does not alter the
balanced growth path requirement at all.
We relegate the proofs of the following propositions to the Appendix.
8Proposition 2 The steady-state proportion of labor employed in the ﬁnan-
cial innovations sector, u∗
τ, is lower in the decentralized economy than in the
social planner’s case.
The divergence arises because the social planner internalizes the spillover
eﬀects of existing ﬁnancial products on ﬁnancial innovations.
We now discuss the implications of the model with regard to the steady-
state proportion of labor employed in the ﬁnancial innovations sector, u∗
τ.
We speciﬁcally investigate the impact on u∗
τ of a change in the following
parameters: (i) the spillover parameter in the ﬁnancial innovations sector,
φ; (ii) the rate of time preference, ρ; and (iii) the degree of risk aversion, θ.
Proposition 3 An increase in the ﬁnancial innovations spillover eﬀect, φ,
increases the steady-state proportion of labor employed in the ﬁnancial in-
novations sector, u∗
τ.
An increase in φ raises the marginal product of labor of ﬁnancial innova-
tors. The share of labor in the ﬁnancial innovations sector must thus rise so
that the wage in this sector once again equals that of the ﬁnal goods sector
in the new equilibrium.
Proposition 4 An increase in the rate of time preference (or households’
discount factor), ρ, decreases the steady-state proportion of labor employed
in the ﬁnancial innovations sector, u∗
τ.
As households become more impatient, they care more for current con-
sumption then future consumption. Hence, more labor is devoted to the
ﬁnal goods sector to produce the ﬁnal consumption good, and correspond-
ingly less labor is devoted to the ﬁnancial innovations sector..
Proposition 5 T h ed e g r e eo fr i s ka v e r s i o n ,θ,d o e sn o ta ﬀect the steady-
state proportion of labor employed in the ﬁnancial innovations sector, u∗
τ.
2.3 Transitional Dynamics
To discuss the properties of the model away from the steady state, we need
to reduce the dimensionality of the problem by assuming that the share of
l a b o ri nt h eﬁnancial innovations sector, uτ, and the physical investment
rate, sK, are constant and exogenous. The model then reduces to
Y = AKα(1 − uτ)1−αL1−α
˙ K = ξsKY − δK
˙ τ = Fuλ
τLλτφ.















and are plotted in the phase diagram below:
Figure 2: Transitional Dynamics of the Basic Model
Suppose the productivity parameter in the production function for ﬁnan-
cial innovations, F, increases, possibly due to eﬃciency-promoting deregu-
lation of the ﬁnancial sector The rise in F shifts the ˙ ξ =0schedule to the
right but leaves the ˙ k =0schedule unchanged. >From the diagram below,
we see that both k and ξ must rise smoothly along the saddle path to their
new levels. The increase in F has no eﬀect on the long-run growth rates of k
and y (which still remain at zero because there is no technological progress),
but it has temporary growth eﬀects in the transition to the new steady state
at higher levels of k∗ and y∗.
10Figure 3: Transitional Dynamics for an Increase in F
3 Financial Innovations and Endogenous Techno-
logical Progress
We now examine a full-blown growth model with a ﬁnancial sector akin to
that in the previous section as well as endogenous technological progress in
the mold of Romer (1990) and Jones (1995). In this class of models, tech-
nological progress is characterized by an increasing variety of intermediate
goods used in the production of the ﬁnal consumption good. Unlike the
“creative destruction” models of Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Grossman
and Helpman (1991c), the producers of these intermediate goods never lose
the monopoly rights to their production nor are they ever superseded by new
producers. The blueprints for new intermediate goods are in turn created by
a real research and development sector which draws labor away from ﬁnal
goods production.
We allow for the stock of ﬁnancial innovations, τ,t oi n ﬂuence the rate at
which new designs for intermediate goods are produced in the R&D sector.
Implicitly, we are using the stock of ﬁnancial innovations as a proxy for the
stage of development of an economy’s ﬁnancial sector: a more sophisticated
ﬁnancial sector is associated with a higher innovation rate. This formulation
attempts to capture the role that venture capitalists play in encouraging
high-risk R&D activities with potentially large technological payoﬀs. We
argue that these venture capital ﬁrms are only ubiquitous in economies with
highly-developed and sophisticated ﬁnancial sectors.
As before, the ﬁnancial sector consists of ﬁnancial innovators who create
new ﬁnancial products, and ﬁnancial intermediaries who use the existing
11stock of ﬁnancial products to intermediate funds between households and
ﬁrms by transforming the savings of the former into productive investment
by the latter. Unlike the model discussed in the previous section, however,
now ﬁnancial intermediaries (or more accurately, their venture capitalist
arms) also extract rents from the real R&D sector for identifying and ﬁ-
nancing high-risk research projects with potentially huge future pay-oﬀs.
For tractability’s sake, we do not diﬀerentiate between ﬁnancial innovations
which improve the eﬃciency of the intermediation process and those which
make the ﬁnancing of ever-riskier projects possible.
In the rest of this section, we ﬁrst present the decentralized, competitive
model, followed by a discussion of the characteristics and implications of
the planner’s solution. The decentralized model will explain how the dif-
ferent actors (households, ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, intermediate goods producers,
real R&D ﬁrms, ﬁnancial intermediaries and ﬁnancial innovators) and con-
stituent components of the model function and interact. A ﬂowchart of the
model is illustrated in Figure 2.
3.1 The Decentralized Model
As in Jones (1995), the ﬁnal goods sector produces the consumption good
Y using labor uY L a n dac o l l e c t i o no fi n t e r m e d i a t ei n p u t sx, taking the
available variety of intermediate inputs A as given:






This speciﬁcation of the production function characterizes technological
change as increasing variety, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Inventions are
basically the discovery of new varieties of producer durables that provide
alternative methods of producing the ﬁnal consumer good.













where wY is the prevailing wage in the ﬁnal goods sector and p(x(i)) is the
price of intermediate good i. The price of the ﬁnal good is normalized to
unity. The ﬁrst-order conditions dictate that








12The intermediate sector comprises an inﬁnite number of ﬁrms on the
interval [0,A] that have purchased a design from the real R&D sector, now
acting as monopolists in the production of their speciﬁcv a r i e t y .F o l l o w i n g
Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), each ﬁrm rents capital at rate rK and,
using the previously purchased design, eﬀortlessly transforms each unit of
capital into a single unit of the intermediate input. (For simplicity, producer
durables are transformed costlessly back into capital at the end of the period
and no depreciation takes place.) Each intermediate ﬁrm therefore solves
the following problem period-by-period:
max
x πx = p(x)x − rKx. (31)
Being monopolists, they see the downward-sloping demand curve for their
producer durables generated in the ﬁnal goods sector. This results in a stan-
dard monopoly problem with constant marginal cost and constant elasticity
of demand, giving rise to the following solutions:

















Each intermediate ﬁrm thus sets the same price and sells the same quantity




¯ xdi = A¯ x, (35)
we can rewrite the aggregate ﬁnal goods production function as
Y = Kα (AuY L)
1−α . (36)
Next, we examine the production of new designs in the real R&D sector.
Here, the rate of innovation is governed by the following production function
˙ A = e B[(1 − uY − uτ)L]
η τβ, (37)
e B ≡ BAψ, (38)
where (1 − uY − uτ) is the share of labor devoted to the production of new
technical designs. In the decentralized model, R&D ﬁrms do not take into
account spillovers from existing designs, Aψ, so they regard e B as exoge-
nously given. As argued previously, a more sophisticated ﬁnancial sector
13(with a greater stock of ﬁnancial innovations, τ) is associated with a higher
innovation rate.
Each R&D ﬁrm derives revenue from the sale of blueprints to intermedi-
ate goods producers, PA ˙ A, and incurs costs wA (1 − uY − uτ)L from labor
hired, and Rττ from services rendered by ﬁnancial intermediaries. Its proﬁts
are therefore
πA = PA ˙ A − wA (1 − uY − uτ)L − Rττ, (39)
where L and τ are both compensated according to their marginal produc-
tivities in R&D production:
wA = PA ˜ Bη[(1 − uY − uτ)L]
η−1 τβ, (40)
Rτ = PA ˜ B [(1 − uY − uτ)L]
η βτβ−1, (41)
where wA is the prevailing wage in the real R&D sector, Rτ is the “rental
rate” of τ charged by ﬁnancial intermediaries, and PA is the price of each
new technical design.
In our model, the ﬁnancial sector is composed of ﬁnancial innovators and
ﬁnancial intermediaries-cum-venture capitalists. The former are responsible
for producing ﬁnancial innovations, τ, which then determines the degree of
sophistication of the ﬁnancial sector, proxied by ξ (equal to the ratio τ/Lκ,
or the number of ﬁnancial innovations per adjusted capita). A greater value
of ξ allows more eﬃcient intermediation between lenders (households) and
borrowers (intermediate goods producers), resulting in a higher percentage
of savings being transformed into useful capital. In addition, a greater value
of ξ also raises the rate at which new R&D designs are produced, as explained
previously.
Financial innovators are monopolists who make extra-normal proﬁts by
producing new ﬁnancial products, using raw labor as input, according to
the production function
˙ τ = e F (uτL)
λ , (42)
where
e F ≡ Fτφ.
As in the real R&D sector, ﬁnancial innovators do not internalize the spillover
eﬀect from the existing stock of ﬁnancial products. They therefore treat e F
as exogenously given.
The proﬁt of a representative ﬁnancial innovator, to be maximized by
its choice of uτ,i s
πτ = Pτ ˙ τ − wτuτL, (43)
14where Pτ is the price of each ﬁnancial innovation. Since ξ is constant in the
steady state (and speciﬁcally equals 1), ˙ τ/τ = κn in the steady state. With








where n is the population growth, ˆ wτ = wτ/A, ξ ≡ τ/Lκ and γ∗
τ =
λn/(1 − φ). From this equation, we see that the price of each ﬁnancial
innovation is simply a constant mark up on the marginal factor cost of labor
in the ﬁnancial innovations sector.
Downstream in the ﬁnancial sector, ﬁnancial intermediaries purchase in-
novations from ﬁnancial innovators (which, in the real world, are probably
sister divisions in the same ﬁnancial ﬁrms) and use them in transforming
savings into productive investment as well as in the funding of real R&D
activities. The ﬁnancial intermediaries derive their income from: (a) charg-
ing the R&D ﬁrms the rate Rτ to ﬁnance their production of new designs;
and (b) by charging ﬁrms in the (real) intermediate sector a higher interest
rate (rK) for renting capital than it pays out to households for their sav-
ings (rV ). The interest rate diﬀerential, (rK − rV ), may be thought of as
the commission charged for intermediating funds. For simplicity, we assume
that ﬁnancial intermediation requires no labor input. Financial intermedi-
aries make zero proﬁts as this sector is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
In each period, the representative ﬁnancial intermediary ensures that
revenues received from the real intermediate sector and R&D ﬁrms equal
the cost of acquiring deposits from households and purchasing new products
from ﬁnancial innovators:
rKK + Rττ = rV K + Pτ ˙ τ. (45)
Finally, to close the model, we examine the consumption decision of house-
holds. As usual, we assume that this decision may be characterized by a
representative consumer maximizing an additively separable utility function
subject to a dynamic budget constraint. We use a conventional CRRA util-
ity function and assume that households are ultimate owners of all capital
and shareholders of ﬁnal goods ﬁrms, real intermediate ﬁrms, R&D ﬁrms,










˙ V = rV K + wY uY L + wτuτL + wAuAL
+Aπx + πτ + πA − PA ˙ A − C, (47)
˙ K = ξ ˙ V, (48)
15where ˙ V represents the ﬂow of households’ stock of assets (i.e. saving), πx,
πτ and πA are the monopolistic proﬁts from the real intermediate sector,
the ﬁnancial innovators and the R&D sector respectively. The monopolis-
tic poﬁts of ﬁnancial innovators, πτ, equal to revenue Pτ ˙ τ, less labor costs
wτuτL, is paid out to households who are alsoshareholders of these ﬁrms.
Unlike Jones (1995), the real R&D sector is also allowed to generate monop-
olistic proﬁts which again accrue ultimately to households. In equilibrium,
wages are equal across all labor markets, i.e. wY = wτ = wA =¯ w.T h e s e
conditions together with equation (45) yield the following households budget
constraint
˙ K = ξ (rKK +¯ wuY L +¯ wuAL + Rττ
+A¯ πx + πA − PA ˙ A − C
´
. (49)
We can show that the prices of R&D blueprints and ﬁnancial innovations















Equation (50) states that the opportunity cost to an intermediate pro-
ducer of investing in a R&D blueprint, ξrKPA,m u s te q u a lt h eﬂow of proﬁts
that it generates, ¯ πx, and its associated capital gain, ˙ PA. Equation (51)
similarly indicates that the opportunity cost to a ﬁnancial intermediary of
purchasing a ﬁnancial innovation, ξrKPτ, must be equal to the average ﬂow
of savings intermediated by a unit of ﬁnancial product, ˙ V/ τ, and the asso-
ciated capital gain, ˙ Pτ.
The solutions for the steady-state levels of uA and uτ, the shares of
labor devoted to the real R&D sector and the ﬁnancial innovations sector
respectively, are shown in the Appendix. Using numerical simulations, we
can demonstrate that their steady-state levels are lower in the decentralized
model compared to their counterparts in the social planner’s solution. The
sources of divergence are the externalities arising from existing R&D designs
and ﬁnancial products (which are only internalized by the social planner),
as well as the monopoly power of intermediate good producers (which is
eliminated by the social planner).
16Figure 4: Flowchart of the Economy
3.2 The Social Planner’s Problem

















1−α − C (t)
i
− δK (t), (53)
˙ τ (t)=F [uτ (t)L(t)]
λ τ (t)
φ , (54)






Note that α ∈ (0,1), {uY (t),u τ (t)} ∈ [0,1] ∀t and {θ,ρ,δ,n} > 0.F u r -
thermore, {λ,η} ∈ (0,1] and {φ,ψ,β} ∈ [0,1]. To arrive at the steady-state
solutions, we deﬁne the following three variables ˆ k ≡ K/AL, χ ≡ C/K and
ξ ≡ τ/Lκ.




[(1 − φ)η + λβ]n







We note two salient features of the solution for the steady-state growth rate
of the economy. The ﬁrst is that ψ < 1, ∴ ψ ∈ [0,1). In contrast to
Romer’s (1990) model where ψ is arbitrarily assigned the value of unity, our
model indicates that it must be strictly less than that. Jones (1995) has
argued that empirical investigations of time series data on various research
and development variables suggest that ψ 6=1 .
The second feature is that the ﬁnancial sector now has a direct impact
on the growth rate of technology and thus output as well3. The growth rate
of Y, given by γA + n, is a monotonically increasing function of the four
elasticity parameters λ, φ, η, β and ψ which aﬀect the production of new
technologies in the research and development sector. Therefore any policy
that raises these elasticity parameters will lead to a higher rate of economic
growth. Speciﬁcally, these policies should be targeted at the researchers
employed in R&D sector (to inﬂuence η), easing their access to the stock
of knowledge embodied in existing inventions (to inﬂuence ψ), and at the
projects undertaken by venture capitalists in encouraging high-risk R&D
activities (to inﬂuence β).




ˆ k/ˆ k =0 , ˙ χ/χ =0 , ˙ ξ/ξ =0 , ˙ uY /uY =0and ˙ uτ/uτ =0 ,w eo b t a i nt h e
following solutions for uτ (the share of labor devoted to the ﬁnancial inno-
vations sector), uY (the share of labor devoted to the ﬁnal goods sector), uA
(the share of labor devoted to the real technological sector), ξ (the eﬃciency
of ﬁnancial intermediation, equal to τ/Lκ), χ (the consumption-capital ra-






3Thisstandsin contrast toour basicmodel wherethesamesector only leadstolevel but
not growth e￿ects. (In that model, spillovers from existing ønancial products to ønancial
innovations, measured by φ, had noimpact on thes te ady-s tategrowth rate .)
18where Γ ≡ Γ1Γ2 + Γ3 and
Γ1 ≡








ρ +( θ − ψ)γ∗
A























A =( 1 − Γ2)(1− u∗
τ)



















































































































Figure 5: Simulated Comparative Statics
3.2.2 Model Implications
Due to the complexity of the analytical solutions, we utilize simulation tech-
niques to investigate the comparative statics of the model. Speciﬁcally, we




A. The comparative statics are performed with respect to
a particular parameter holding the other parameters constant. They should
be interpreted relative to the base model with the following set of baseline
20values:
α δ ρ θ n λ φ η ψ β
1
3 0.0 0.02 1.5 0.02 2
3 0.2 2
3 0.2 0.2
Figure 5 presents the impact on u∗
τ, u∗
Y and u∗
A over a range of values for
each of the ﬁve parameters. The results of our comparative statics exercise
are summarized in the following table (the arrows indicate the direction of
change in the variables on the ﬁrst column given an increase in the value of








We ﬁnd that a rise in φ decreases u∗
τ but increases u∗
Y and u∗
A:s i n c et h e
stock of ﬁnancial products grow at the ﬁxed rate κn in the steady state, a rise
in φ means that ﬁnancial innovators get a bigger “kick” from existing ﬁnan-
cial products, so that less labor is required to produce the pre-determined
number of ﬁnancial innovations. This frees up labor to be channelled to the
ﬁnal goods sector and the real R&D sector. A rise in β increases the impor-
tance of τ o nt h ep r o d u c t i o no fn e wR & Dd e s i g n s( t h eu l t i m a t es o u r c eo f
growth in this model) as well as raises the marginal product of labor in that
sector. The former creates a higher demand for ﬁnancial products which
leads to a rise in u∗
τ while the latter induces a rise in u∗
A in order to bring
wages across the sectors back to equilibrium again. Similarly, an increase
in ψ raises the productivity of labor in the R&D sector thereby inducing u∗
A
to rise at the expense of u∗
Y and u∗
τ to equalise wages.
The impact of ρ and θ on the shares of labor in the three sectors are
similar. An increase in either ρ or θ increases u∗
Y but decreases u∗
τ and u∗
A.
The explanation is straightforward: an increase in either ρ or θ indicates
a rise in households’ preference for current consumption. Consequently,
more labor is devoted to the production of the ﬁnal consumption good at
the expense of the other two sectors.
4 Human Capital and Financial Innovations
We now insert our formulation of the ﬁnancial sector into the well-known
Lucas (1988) model of human capital, which is based on earlier work by
Uzawa (1965). The idea here is that the production of ﬁnancial innovations
is costly not only in terms of foregone production of the ﬁnal consumption
good, but also because it draws human capital away from the generation of
new human capital. In the real world, for example, the aggressive recruiting
21of the best graduates from each cohort by ﬁnancial powerhouses prevents
such talent from being channelled into academia and the teaching profession.
In this model, we examine the optimum allocation of human capital
between the ﬁnal goods, ﬁnancial and human capital sectors and observe
how this varies according to the elasticities and productivity parameters of
the various inputs in these sectors.

















α (uY (t)H (t))
1−α − C (t)
i
− δK (t), (66)
˙ τ (t)=F [uτ (t)H (t)]
λ τ (t)
φ , (67)
˙ H (t)=D[1 − uY (t) − uτ (t)]H (t) − δH (t). (68)
Note that α ∈ (0,1), {uY (t),u τ (t)} ∈ [0,1] ∀t, {θ,ρ,δ,n} > 0, λ ∈ (0,1]
and φ ∈ [0,1].
To arrive at the steady-state solutions, we ﬁrst deﬁne the following three
variables ω ≡ K/H, χ ≡ C/K and ζ ≡ τ/Hκ. In the steady state, we


















We also require that ˙ uY /uY =0in the steady state. Hence, ˙ ω/ω =0
in order to satisfy equation (70). This then suggests that ˙ K/K = ˙ H/H
in the steady state. Furthermore, it is assumed that ˙ χ/χ = ˙ ζ/ζ =0in
the steady state. Hence, these assumptions imply that to have a balanced
growth path, we must have ˙ Y/Y = ˙ K/K = ˙ C/C = γH and ˙ τ/τ = κγH in
the steady state, where γH ≡ ˙ H/H and κ = λ/(1 − φ). The growth rate
is now determined endogenously instead of being equal to some exogenous
population growth rate, as was the case in the ﬁrst two models.
The model is solved in terms of the ﬁve unknowns ω, χ, ζ, uY and uτ.
The ﬁve equations needed to pin down the solutions to these variables are
given by ˙ ω/ω =0 , ˙ χ/χ =0 , ˙ ζ/ζ =0 , ˙ uY /uY =0and ˙ uτ/uτ =0 .T h e s e
ﬁve conditions lead to the following equations respectively:
22ζAωα−1u1−α
Y − ζχ = γ∗
H + δ, (71)
ζAαωα−1u1−α


















































Using equations (71) to (74), we obtain the following solutions for uτ, uY ,



















[D − ρ − (θ − 1)γ∗



















ρ +( θ − α)γ∗


















































H is the root of
Du∗
H − δ = γ∗
H, (81)
23and
Γ ≡ (1 − α)(ρ + θγ∗
H + δ)[ρ +(θ + λ − 1)γ∗
H],
Φ ≡ κα(γ∗
H + δ)[ρ +( θ − 1)γ∗
H].
Note that γ∗
H is the value of ˙ H/H in the steady state which yields the
steady-state growth rate of the economy. It is apparent from equation
(81)t h a tγ∗
H = f (α,δ,ρ,θ,φ,D). Although it is impossible to obtain γ∗
H
in analytic form, we use numerical techniques for its solution and perform
comparative statics numerically using the following set of baseline values for
the parameters:
α δ ρ θ λ φ A D
1
3 0.05 0.02 1.5 2
3 0.2 1 0.15
The simulation results are presented in the ﬁgures below. Figure 6 presents
the graphs for the shares of human capital. The results for γ∗
H are also
presented in Figure 7 to help analyze the size of the impact.
The set of baseline values yield a steady-state growth rate, γ∗
H,o f4.17%
approximately. The matrix below provides an overview of the direction of
change in γ∗















An increase in α raises the marginal product of human capital in the
ﬁn a lg o o d ss e c t o r . S i n c ew a g e sm u s te q u a t ea c r o s sa l lm a r k e t sf o rh u m a n
capital in equilibrium according to its marginal product, the share of human
capital in the ﬁnal goods sector must rise relative to the share in the other
sectors. Our results show that the rise comes at the expense of a fall in u∗
H
t h u sl e a d i n gt oaf a l li nγ∗
H.A ni n c r e a s ei nδ ceteris paribus decreases γ∗
H
since it aﬀects directly the accumulation of human capital. However, given
that both physical and human capital accumulation depend on the stock of
human capital, more human capital is needed in the human capital sector
to counteract the higher rate of depreciation, i.e. u∗
H increases. This has
the opposite eﬀect of raising γ∗
H. Our simulations indicate that the former
eﬀect dominates the latter.
An increase in either ρ or θ decreases γ∗
H.B o t hh a v et h ee ﬀect of favoring
current consumption vis-a-vis future consumption, leading to more human
capital being channelled to the ﬁnal goods sector at the expense of the
24other two sectors. Naturally, the fall in u∗
H then leads to a fall in γ∗
H.
An increase in φ increases the marginal product of human capital in the
ﬁnancial innovations sector. In order to bring the marginal products back
to equilibrium across the sectors, the share of human capital in the ﬁnancial
innovations sector has to rise relative to the share in the other sectors. Our
results indicate that u∗
H falls while u∗
τ and u∗










































































Figure 6: Simulated Comparative Statics
Finally, an increase in the level of productivity in the education sector, D,
25has a direct eﬀect of raising the rate of human capital accumulation and thus
γ∗
H. On the other hand, our simulations indicate a rise in D also channels
more human capital to the ﬁnancial innovations sector at the expense of the
other two, which has the opposite eﬀect on γ∗
H. It appears that the former
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Figure 7: Impact of Model Parameters on the Steady-State Growth Rate
5P o l i c y I m p l i c a t i o n s
Our model with technological progress suggests that government subsidies
for ﬁnancial innovations may raise the steady-state level of capital and out-
put per capita through its eﬀect on the rate of technological innovations.
With these subsidies, the ﬁnancial sector develops more rapidly (its ma-
turity being measured by the stock of ﬁnancial products) and assists the
real R&D sector more capably through its venture capital role. However,
as none of the parameters in the ﬁnancial innovations equation aﬀect the
steady-state growth rate of the economy, subsidies have level but not long-
r u ng r o w t he ﬀects.
Deregulation of the ﬁnancial sector may lead to increased productivity of
ﬁnancial innovators (captured in our model by a rise in F), which raises the
steady-state per-capita capital stock and output but not their growth rates.
(We can show that when F is too low, the economy may never achieve a 100
per cent transformation of savings into investment, i.e. ξ < 1 in the steady
26state.) Similarly, opening the ﬁnancial sector of a less developed economy to
leading-edge ﬁnancial ﬁrms from advanced countries will enable a transfer
of ﬁnancial expertise from the more advanced country to the less developed
one, allowing the latter to raise its F parameter and thereby attain its
steady-state sooner while achieving a higher level of GDP per capita. This
eﬀect is not to be confused with the issue of increasing capital ﬂows between
countries.
The results from our model with endogenous human capital accumula-
tion suggest that government policies which aﬀect the productivity of the
education sector raises the long-run growth rate of the economy. However,
varying the exponent on the spillover eﬀect of existing ﬁnancial products on
ﬁnancial innovations has no impact on the steady-state growth rate in our
model with endogenous technological progress. So perhaps we can argue
t h a tag o v e r n m e n ti n t e n to ng e n e r a t i n gh i g hl o n g - r u ng r o w t hs h o u l df o c u s
its attention and direct its subsidies more towards the educational sector
rather than the technological or ﬁnancial sectors.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we set out to investigate how the extraordinary expansion in
the variety of ﬁnancial products and the increasing sophistication of the ﬁ-
nancial sector lead to rising aﬄuence in the context of an endogenous growth
model. The channels we explored are capital accumulation and technological
innovation.
We developed a formulation of the ﬁnancial sector which was then em-
bedded in three growth models, including one in which technological progress
is modelled endogenously as an expansion in the variety of intermediate
goods and another in which a broad deﬁnition of capital used in the produc-
tion of ﬁnal goods includes both physical and human capital. Our ﬁnancial
sector comprises ﬁnancial innovators and ﬁnancial intermediaries. Financial
innovators utilize labor (or human capital) and the existing catalog of ﬁ-
nancial products to develop new ﬁnancial products and services. Financial
intermediaries then purchase these innovations to improve their eﬃciency in
transforming household savings into productive investment by ﬁrms. In the
model with endogenous technological progress, we also allowed for spillovers
from ﬁnancial innovations into the production of new designs in the real
R&D sector.
By solving for the steady-state values of the variables of interest and
analyzing the resulting comparative statics, we showed that ﬁnancial inno-
vations ultimately aﬀect the long-run growth rate only through the channel
of technological innovation The rise in transformative eﬃciency of savings
into new capital through the adoption of ﬁnancial innovations slows and
eventually comes to a halt in the steady state, so that an increase in the
27marginal productivity of the ﬁnancial sector leads to growth eﬀects on the
transitional path to the steady state but only level eﬀects in the long run.
We then discussed the policy implications arising from these results.
Extensions to be explored and future research plans include opening the
economy to allow for capital inﬂows and outﬂows, as well as formulating
am o d e lw i t hﬁnancial innovation, endogenous technological progress and
endogenous human capital accumulation.
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AM a t h e m a t i c a l P r o o f s
Proof for Proposition 2. The representative consumer in the decentral-










˙ V = rV K + wY uY L + wτuτL + πτ − C,
˙ K = ξ ˙ V,
˙ τ = ˜ F (uτL)
λ ,
where ˙ V is the ﬂow of savings accumulated by households, rV is the rate
of interest paid by ﬁnancial intermediaries to households on the stock of
savings that has been successfully transformed i.e. K, πτ is the monopolis-
tic proﬁts earned by the producers of ﬁnancial products, τ,a n d ˜ F ≡ Fτφ.
The equation for ˙ τ diﬀers from that in the social planner’s case because the
ﬁnancial innovators do not internalize the spillovers from existing ﬁnancial
products. The monopolistic proﬁts, equal to revenue Pτ ˙ τ less labor costs
wτuτL, accrue to households who also own the ﬁrms in the ﬁnancial innova-
tions sector. In every period, ﬁnancial intermediaries earn rKK from their
loans to ﬁrms which is just enough to cover their payments, rV K and Pτ ˙ τ,
to households (for their deposits) and the ﬁnancial innovations sector (for
the ﬁnancial products) respectively. In equilibrium, wages are equal across
all labor markets, i.e. wY = wτ =¯ w. These conditions together yield the
following households budget constraint
˙ K = ξ (rKK +¯ wuY L − C).






31where Γ ≡ αλnγ∗
τ, Φ ≡ (1 − α)(ρ + n)[ρ + γ∗
τ] and γ∗
τ = λn/(1 − φ).E x -
pressing the ratio of the two shares of labor, (u∗
τ/u∗
Y )




SP, where DC and SP denote the decentralized economy and the








(1 − φ)(ρ + λn)








which shows that u∗DC
τ <u ∗SP
τ as long as φ > 0. The divergence between
the two increases as φ increases.
Proof for Proposition 3. The partial total derivative of u∗
τ with























Proof for Proposition 4. The partial total derivative of u∗
τ with




















2ρ +( 1+λ)n + δ




Proof for Proposition 5. The partial total derivative of u∗
τ with











e−ρt + νξ(rKK +¯ wuY L +¯ wuAL + Rττ





τLλ + υ ˜ Bu
η
ALητβ.






where Γ ≡ Γ1Γ2 + Γ3 and
Γ1 ≡


























Y = Γ2 (1 − u∗
τ),
u∗
A =( 1 − Γ2)(1− u∗
τ).
Note that depreciation is dropped here for simplicity.

















τLλτφ + υB (1 − uY − uτ)
η LητβAψ,
where the control variables are c, uY and uτ, the state variables are K, τ
and A,a n dν, µ and υ are the costate variables associated with K, τ and A
respectively. The ﬁrst-order conditions are:
∂H
∂C
= c−θe−ρt − ντ =0 , (83)
∂H
∂uy
= ντKαA1−α(1 − α)u−α






τ Lλτφ − υBη(1 − uY − uτ)
η−1 LητβAψ =0 . (85)






Y L1−α−κ − δ
¢
, (86)












−υB(1 − uY − uτ)
η Lηβτβ−1Aψ, (87)
˙ υ = −
∂H
∂A
= −ντKα(1 − α)A−αu1−α
Y L1−α−κ
−υB(1 − uY − uτ)
η LητβψAψ−1. (88)



















= B (1 − uY − uτ)
η LητβAψ−1. (91)
and the transversality conditions are
lim
t→∞
ν (t)K (t)=0 , (92)
lim
t→∞




To arrive at the steady-state solutions, we ﬁrst deﬁne the following three
variables ˆ k ≡ K/AL, χ ≡ C/K and ξ ≡ τ/Lκ. In the steady state, we





















In addition, ˙ uY /uY =0in the steady state. Hence, ˙ k/k = ˙ A/A in order
to satisfy equation (96). This then suggests that ˙ K/K = ˙ A/A + n,g i v e n
equation (56), in the steady state. Furthermore, it is assumed that ˙ χ/χ =
˙ ξ/ξ =0in the steady state. Hence these assumptions imply that a balanced
growth path requires ˙ Y/Y = ˙ K/K = ˙ C/C = ˙ A/A+n and ˙ τ/τ = κn in the
steady state.
With endogenous technological progress embedded in the model, the
growth rate of output is now augmented by the growth rate of technology.
Again, this result is comparable to that of the Cass-Koopman’s model with
34technological progress. The presence of technological progress oﬀsets the
diminishing marginal product of physical capital, thereby continually raising
the productivity level of labor.
To solve for ˙ A/A, we impose the conditions that ˙ A/A and ˙ τ/τ are con-





˙ uY +˙ uτ
1 − uY − uτ






+ λn +( φ − 1)γτ =0 . (98)
Since ˙ uY =˙ uτ =0in the steady state, solving equations (97) and (98) for
γA and γτ thus yields
γ∗
A =
[(1 − φ)η + λβ]n








C =c o n s u m p t i o n
ρ = subjective discount rate
θ =c o e ﬃcient of risk-aversion in the utility function
δ = rate of depreciation
t =t i m e
K =p h y s i c a lc a p i t a l
L =l a b o r
n =r a t eo fg r o w t ho ft h el a b o rf o r c e
uY = share of labor (or human capital) devoted to production of ﬁnal con-
sumption good
uτ = share of labor (or human capital) devoted to production of ﬁnancial
innovations
uA = share of labor devoted to R&D of new technological designs
uH = share of labor devoted to production of human capital
H = stock of human capital
τ =s t o c ko fﬁnancial innovations
ξ ≡ τ/Lκ =e ﬃciency of intermediation between savings and investment
ς ≡ τ/Hκ =n u m b e ro fﬁnancial innovations per adjusted unit of human
capital
χ ≡ C/K = consumption-capital ratio
k ≡ K/L = capital-labor ratio
b k ≡ K/AL = technology-augmented capital-labor ratio
ω ≡ K/H =p h y s i c a lt oh u m a nc a p i t a lr a t i o
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τ = steady-state growth rate of the stock of ﬁnancial innovations
γ∗
A = steady-state growth rate of the number of intermediate goods
γ∗
H = steady-state growth rate of human capital
i = index of intermediate goods
A =n u m b e ro fi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o d s
x = quantity of any intermediate
wj = wage rate in sector j
rV = interest rate on transformed savings earned by households
rK = interest rate paid by ﬁnancial intermediaries by borrowers (ﬁrms)
p(xi) = price of intermediate good i
πx =p r o ﬁts earned by a producer of an intermediate good
πτ =p r o ﬁts earned by a ﬁnancial innovator
α = capital’s share of income generated in ﬁnal goods production
λ = elasticity of ﬁnancial innovation production with respect to labor
φ = elasticity of ﬁnancial innovation production with respect to the existing
stock of ﬁnancial products
κ = a measure of the average degree of rivalry in ﬁnancial products
η = elasticity of R&D production with respect to labor
ψ = elasticity of R&D production with respect to the existing stock of R&D
designs
β = elasticity of R&D production with respect to the stock of ﬁnancial
innovations
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